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Abstract
We consider network graphs G = (V,E) in which adjacent nodes
share common secrets. In this setting, certain techniques for perfect
end-to-end security (in the sense of confidentiality, authenticity (imply-
ing integrity) and availability, i.e., CIA+) can be made applicable with-
out end-to-end shared secrets and without computational intractability
assumptions. To this end, we introduce and study the concept of a
unique-neighborhood network, in which nodes are uniquely identifiable
upon their graph-topological neighborhood. While the concept is mo-
tivated by authentication, it may enjoy wider applicability as being a
technology-agnostic (yet topology aware) form of addressing nodes in a
network.
1 Introduction
Let a network be given as an undirected graph G = (V,E), in which node
adjacency {u, v} ∈ E is characterized by two nodes u and v sharing a common
secret (key). Consider the following question:
Can any two nodes u, v ∈ V , which are not adjacent (i.e., {u, v} /∈
E) exchange messages with computationally unconditional privacy,
authenticity and reliability?
By its formulation, an answer cannot use any complexity-theoretic intractability
assumptions, thus ruling out public-key cryptographic techniques. Availability
is typically a matter of redundancy, and it is known that both, unconditional
privacy and availability are both achievable by certain graph connectivity prop-
erties and Multipath transmission (MPT) based on secret sharing [10]. In the
simplest yet provably most efficient setting [4], Alice sends a message m to Bob
according to the following scheme:
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1. Alice encodes m into a set s1, . . . , sk shares, so that any d out of these
k shares suffice to reconstruct the message, while no set of less than d
shares leaks any information about m. This is a standard application of
polynomial (d, k)-threshold secret sharing [9].
2. Alice chooses a set of k node-disjoint paths pi1, . . . , pik from her node to
Bob. Herein, two paths pii, pij are said to be node-disjoint, if they satisfy
V (pi1) ∩ V (pi2) = {Alice, Bob}, where V (pi) is the vertex set of the path.
That is, any two paths intersect nowhere in G except at the end-points.
3. Bob reconstructs the secret as usual for polynomial secret sharing, poten-
tially recovering from up to b(k − d)/2c errors. This recovery is possible
by the Welch-Berlekamp algorithm [2], exploiting the known “isomorphy”
between polynomial secret sharing and Reed-Solomon encoding [5].
This form of MPT achieves confidentiality against any attacker being able to
sniff on < d nodes, by design of the secret sharing. Reliability of the trans-
mission follows from the error correction capability of the sharing treated as an
error-correcting code. Note that this protocol does not need any point-to-point
encryption, if the attacker is constrained to eavesdrop on nodes only, and on
strictly less than d of them. This is what we shall assume w.l.o.g. throughout
the paper1.
The obstacle towards practical implementations of this scheme is the network
needing to provide k node-disjoint paths. This property is, by a Theorem of
H.Whitney [3, Thm. 5.17] equivalent to k-vertex-connectivity of G: a graph
G = (V,E) is k-connected (more specifically k-vertex-connected), if it takes at
least k nodes to be removed from G until the graph becomes disconnected. That
is, Alice and Bob cannot be disconnected by removing up to any k − 1 nodes
between them. Whitney’s theorem equates this condition to the existence of k
node-disjoint paths between Alice and Bob. While this is a strong connectivity
requirement in general, 2-connectivity is a highly common feature of networks
for the sake of resilience against single node failures. The general problem of
extending a graph into k-connectedness is computationally intractable [7], but
the construction of large k-connected graphs from smaller ones is inductively
easy [6]:
1. Start with the ⊆-smallest2 k-connected graph, which is the complete graph
Kk+1.
2. Given any two k-connected graphs G1 = (V1, E1), G2 = (V2, E2), pick k
nodes from each graph, denoted as u1, . . . , uk ∈ V1 and v1, . . . , vk ∈ G2,
1The case of an attacker being able to listen on all the lines in a network requires point-to-
point encryption, which, for unconditional security, would call for additional techniques like
quantum key distribution protocols (e.g., BB84 [1]) in the network. We leave such techno-
logical extensions aside in this work, and shall remain independent of any such assumptions
in stating that shared secrets just “exist”, without adopting any prescriptions on how this is
practically done.
2Herein, the subgraph relation G1 ⊆ G2 between two graphs G1 = (V1, E1), G2 = (V2, E2)
holds if V1 ⊆ V2 and E1 ⊆ E2.
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Figure 1: Multipath authentication – Example scheme
and form the connected graph H = (V1 ∪ V2, E1 ∪ E2 ∪{(ui, vi) : i =
1, . . . , k}). Then H is again k-connected.
Thus, if the network is to be constructed from scratch in a hierarchical fashion,
maintaining it k-connected is a simple matter of proper connections between
subnetworks into the bigger network.
Authenticity is a different story, but achievable along similar lines: Multipath
authentication (MPA) resembles the common form of how hand-written signa-
tures are verified in companies. Departments typically maintain samples of
the handwritten signature of a decision maker to verify it on paper documents
(otherwise, anyone could just scrawl some name and claim it to be someone
else’s handwritten signature). The digital version of this procedure uses the
point-to-point shared secrets to mimic a “signature” by a conventional Message
authentication code (MAC). Specifically, if Alice’s node v has a neighbor set
nb(v) = {w ∈ V : {v, w} ∈ E}, and shares a key si with each neighbor i ∈ nb(v).
She can use these to undersign a message using a set of MACs under the keys
s1, . . . , sk for k ≤ |nb(Alice)|. Bob, upon reception of the MACs, can ask
Alice’s neighbors for verification, and properly react upon their replies (along
node-disjoint paths again). This protocol is depicted in Figure 1 and, using
techniques of game theory and universal hashing for the functions MAC and h,
is provably secure without any computational intractability assumptions [8]. It
must be noted that the vertex-connectivity number k of the graph needs not be
equal to the number of neighbors or paths used; it must only be large enough
to admit the sought number of neighbors/paths. As such, the number (here
k) of paths can be less than the vertex-connectivity number of the graph (also
denoted as k here).
The remaining question concerns the uniqueness of Bob in being the “signer”
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of the message in the MPA scheme. Is it only Alice that could have attached the
MAC set {MAC(h(m), ki) : i ∈ nb(Alice)}? Apparently so, if the neighborhood
of Alice uniquely characterizes, resp. distinguishes, her from all other nodes in
the network. This, however, is a nontrivial property of a graph, and in the
center of study in this work hereafter.
2 Problem Statement
We study the problem of characterizing a node v ∈ V based only on its graph-
topological neighborhood, i.e., we are interested in graphs with the following
property:
Definition 1 (Unique-Neighborhood Network). A graphG = (V,E) is a Unique-
neighborhood network (UNN), if the mapping v ∈ V 7→ nb(v) := {w : {v, w} ∈ E}
is injective.
The existence of such graphs is immediate by simple examples, such as lines
(Figure 2a), circles, or the complete graph. The property, however, may arise
or vanish upon adding edges. For instance, the graph in Figure 2c is a UNN,
but loses this property upon adding the edge {2, 4} to it, as in Figure 2d. It
regains unique-neighborhoods, however, when the edges {1, 3} and {2, 4} are
added (Figure 2b).
3 An Algebraic Condition to Test for UNN
Hereafter, let n = |V | be the number of nodes in G. Let A ∈ {0, 1}n×n be the
graph’s adjacency matrix, with aij = 1 whenever node i is connected to node
j and zero otherwise. Each row/column of the matrix thus corresponds to a
node, and the i-th row in A can be taken as a vector of indicators, describing
the neighbourhood of node i. Likewise, since G is undirected and A is hence
symmetric, the same goes for the columns of A.
A UNN has pairwise distinct rows/columns, so it is conceptually straight-
forward to sort the rows of A in any order, and to look for adjacent identical
rows. While the problem is algorithmically easy, we can also give an algebraic
condition to induce the UNN property. Several sufficient conditions are imme-
diate to imply distinct rows, such as full rank of the adjacency matrix A, or the
matrix being orthogonal. Those, however, is also necessary, so these are overly
strong for our purposes.
In a more direct approach, we can directly ask for pairwise distinctness, and
it turns out that this is easy to cast into an algebraic condition: let xi be the i-th
row of the adjacency matrix A. Consider the ij-th entry a
(2)
ij in A ·AT = A2
(the bracketed superscript in a
(2)
ij shall be a reminder that we indeed do not just
square aij , since actually a
(2)
ij =
∑n
k=1 aikakj = x
T
i xj).
If i 6= j, then two cases are possible:
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1. if xi = xj , then we can write a
(2)
ij = x
T
i xi
2. Otherwise, if xi 6= xj , then the sum giving xTi xj will be such that at least
one 1-entry in xi “matches” with a 0-entry in xj (or vice versa), since
otherwise, the two vectors would be identical. Thus, the sum xTi xj must
be strictly less than xTi xi (by at least 1), since this latter expression has
all 1-entries count into the result, as opposed to xTi xj having at least one
1-entry being cancelled out by the other factor.
Now, look into the first row of A2 = ATA = AAT : in this row, we have all
scalar products xT1 xi, for which the result is always ≤ xT1 x1, with equality if
and only if xi = x1. That is, we can test for another copy of x1 to exist by
looking if all entries are less than the first. This is already half the test: the
matrix A has pairwise distinct rows if and only if the diagonal element in the
i-th row of A2 is strictly greater than all other elements in that row (likewise,
column).
We can convert this into an algebraic inequality condition: write 1n×m to
mean the (n × m)-matrix of all 1-entries, and observe that xTi xi = xTi 1n×1.
Thus, we can create the diagonal entry in A2 alternatively by multiplying with
1 2
nb(1) = {2}, nb(2) = {1}
(a) UNN: Line graph
1
3
2
4
nb(1) = {2,3,4}, nb(2) = {1,3,4}
nb(3) = {1,2,4}, nb(4) = {1,2,3}
(b) UNN: Complete graph K4
1
3
2
4
nb(1) = {2,4}, nb(2) = {1}
nb(3) = {4}, nb(4) = {1,3}
(c) another UNN
1
3
2
4
nb(1) = nb(3) = {2,4}
nb(2) = nb(4) = {1,3}
(d) Not a UNN: the complete bipartite graph K2,2
Figure 2: Examples
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a vector of all 1es. Extending this idea, note that the entry xTi xi appears in
all columns along the i-th row in A · 1n×n. Our condition asks for the diagonal
to be strictly larger than the other elements in the same row, and all we have
left to do “artificially increase” the actual diagonal by 1 so that the <-condition
holds there too (otherwise we would have equality).
Overall, we end up with the following conclusion:
Theorem 1. A graph G = (V,E) with n = |V | nodes is a UNN, if and only if
its adjacency matrix A satisfies
A · 1n×n + In −A2 ≥ 1n×n. (1)
where In is the n-th identity matrix and the inequality holds per element.
Note that by symmetry, the resulting number of constraints is twice as many
as needed, since the inequality will hold for the upper triangle in the same way
as for the lower triangle; the diagonal does not need to be considered either.
For directed networks, observe that we did not use the symmetry of A any-
where, the same derivation can be applied to give a condition for unique neigh-
borhoods, now defined in terms of incoming or outgoing edges. Unique outgoing
neighbourhoods correspond to pairwise distinct rows, while unique incoming
neighbourhoods correspond to pairwise distinct columns.
Corollary 1. Let G = (V,E) be a directed graph, and let A be its adjacency
matrix. The graph G is a UNN,
• with unique outgoing edges, if and only if, A · 1n×n + In −AAT ≥ 1n×n,
• with unique incoming edges, if and only if, AT ·1n×n+In−ATA ≥ 1n×n,
where the inequality holds per element.
Both conditions, by symmetry of A, boil down to (1) if G is undirected.
Constructing optimal networks w.r.t. to some cost function c : {0, 1}n×n →
R on the adjacency matrix is then a matter of constrained nonlinear optimiza-
tion:
minA∈{0,1}n×n c(A)
subject to (1).
}
(2)
The problem for directed graphs is straightforward by replacing the constraints
accordingly. One instance of (2) could be, for example, looking for the smallest
UNN in which a given graph G appears as a subgraph. Conversely, we can
look for the largest subgraph inside G that is a UNN. This is done in the next
section.
4 Construction and Encounter of UNNs
It is highly unlikely that random graphs, e.g., scale-free or others come up as
UNNs. Taking the internet as an example of a scale-free topology, just consider
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an Internet service provider (ISP) with a set of customers. Each customer is
typically connected to only one ISP, making this node the only and hence non-
unique neighborhood of the customer. However, an ISPs located in the center of
a star topology may consider its customers as a unique neighborhood to another
ISP, unless the two have an identical lot of customers.
Though a graph G = (V,E) may not be a UNN, is there perhaps a subgraph
G′ = (V ′, E′) with V ′ ⊆ V,E′ ⊆ E that is a UNN? A positive answer is
reached by looking at trees first. First, let us define the degree of a node v in
an undirected graph is the number |nbv|.
Lemma 1. Let G = (V,E) be a tree, and let S be the set of all nodes having
degree 1 in G. Then, all nodes in V \ S have unique neighborhoods in (the full
graph) G.
Proof. The nodes in S are all leafs in the tree, and their inclusion leaves the
mapping f : v 7→ nb(v) restricted to inner nodes only. Consequently, we consider
injectivity of f only on the set V \ S, but with the neighborhood nb being
determined by the full set V . For any two inner nodes u, v, those may have the
same parents, but since G is a tree, they have distinct children, thus making
the corresponding neighborhood (composed from parents and children, possibly
also from S) pairwise distinct.
Lemma 1 is not optimal in the sense that a leaf that is singleton (in the
sense of having no “siblings”, i.e., sharing its parent with no other vertex in G)
can be included, and the graph remains a UNN. More generally, we can even
connect any two disjoint UNNs by a single or multiple edges, with the resulting
graph again being a UNN.
Lemma 2. Let G1 = (V1, E1), G2 = (V2, E2) be UNNs, with V1∩V2 = ∅. Select
any k distinct nodes u1, . . . , uk ∈ V1 and v1, . . . , vk ∈ V2, and construct the
graph H = (V1 ∪ V2, E1 ∪ E2 ∪ {{ui, vi} : i = 1, . . . , n}). Then, H is a UNN.
Proof. Since we connect a node ui to vi (only), the neighborhoods of both are
just extended by the other. But since neither node appears in the other graph,
the neighborhoods remain distinct. The remaining nodes that were not involved
in the connection between G1, G2 retain their neighborhoods as they were, which
are again unique since the graphs were vertex-disjoint.
Unfortunately, Lemma 2 does not lend itself to a greedy construction algo-
rithm for a node- or edge-minimal UNN, since the property is non-monotone
in terms of the subgraph relation, as the example graphs in Figure 2 show.
Thus, the set of all UNNs does not form a matroid. Still, Lemma 2 allows to
inductively construct large UNNs by starting from small UNNs and connecting
them in the way as described by the Lemma. The initial “atomic” networks
can be constructed from scratch, much in the same way as we can construct k-
connected networks. Indeed, since the complete graph Kk+1 is trivially a UNN,
we can even simultaneously preserve both properties, UNN and k-connectivity,
upon an inductive construction of large networks.
More interesting for our purposes is the corollary from these two results:
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Corollary 2. Every undirected graph G = (V,E) has a vertex-maximal subgraph
G′ = (V ′, E′) that is a UNN, and which only excludes nodes (if any) of degree
1 in G.
Proof. Take T = (VT , ET ) as any spanning tree in G, then Lemma 1 tells that
every inner node of T has unique neighborhoods. Let V oT be the set of inner
nodes in T , and let E′ = (V oT × V oT ) ∩ E be the induced edge set. Let v ∈ V oT
be an arbitrary node for which all u ∈ nb(v) have degree 1. That is, v is a(ny)
node that is directly connected to leaf nodes in T . For each such node v, we
can pick exactly one of its children c ∈ VT (a leaf) arbitrarily, and add the edge
{v, c} to E′. By Lemma 2, the so-extended tree remains a UNN. Moreover, it is
a vertex-maximal such subgraph, since adding any further leaf node connected
to some v ∈ V oT , we would end up with two children c1, c2 of v whose common
neighborhood is {v}. Since T was spanning, there are no other nodes that we
could add.
Obviously by construction, Corollary 2 only assures a UNN subgraph of
“minimal” vertex-connectivity as being a tree. To benefit from the aforemen-
tioned possibility of preserving k-connectivity besides being a UNN when the
graph grows, Corollary 2 is apparently not very useful as the inner UNN is only
1-connected. Its primary applicability is rather to provide a starting point for
optimization like in (2): if G is not a UNN, we can pick a maximal subgraph
of G that is a UNN, and keep adding edges (from G or new ones), until G has
been extended into the “smallest” UNN that covers G.
5 Graph-Topological Addressing and Security
The existence of a vertex-maximal subgraph being a UNN is not at all surprising,
but the important fact is that the network is a UNN until the “last mile” to
the customer, who typically is a node of degree 1. Routing messages into such
nodes, however, makes sense only if the node itself is already the receiver, so the
actual addressing is only needed until the hop right before the final node. Once
this butlast node has been reached, the final point-to-point connection needs no
further addressing.
Corollary 2 is thus the final key to “technology agnostic addressing” in the
sense as we look for: let G = (V,E) be any network that is not necessarily a
UNN. Within G, we can construct a minimal spanning tree (by known algo-
rithms), which relative to the entire network G is already a UNN. All nodes
outside this UNN are excluded only for sharing a common connection point into
the UNN T . Now, consider the nodes in T as ISPs, arranged in some hierarchi-
cal structure that the tree reflects, then the nodes outside T are all customers
connected to the same ISP, but these are directly reachable from their indi-
vidual ISP node. Thus, we only nodes with a non-unique neighborhoods are
the ISPs’s customers, while within the larger (inter)net, nodes can be addressed
purely using their localities.
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The addressing of nodes based on their neighborhoods is agnostic of technol-
ogy, but in the same degree needs to be aware of topology. As such it may not
be applicable in certain specialized domains such as on-chip networks or ad hoc
networks. The main area of application are hence fixed network installations
such as those maintained by ISPs.
This technological/graph-topological effort comes with a significant practical
advantage from the perspective of usable security : it requires key-management
in the sense of exchanging common secrets, only between a considerably small
number of nodes. Precisely, while symmetric end-to-end encryption in a network
of n nodes would require O(n2) keys to be exchanged, multipath schemes as de-
scribed here require only |E| such keys to be shared between direct neighbors,
while still providing end-to-end security without computational intractability.
More important from a practical perspective is the fact that the key-management
does not need to rest with Alice or Bob as users: unlike public-key encryption
that relies on complex certificate management that to a wide extent runs on
the application layer (and hence is in Alice and Bob’s direct hands), multipath
transmission and UNN maintenance (i.e., establishment, broadcast and updates
to neighborhoods) can run entirely below the application layer, thus providing
addressing and confidentiality in a technology agnostic form and completely
transparent for all users. Especially matters of maintaining a UNN are flexible
and do not need to take into account the entire network topology: an implicit
point made in the proof of Corollary 2 is the fact that we do not need all graph-
topological neighbors, while it suffices to include only a selection of them to
define unique neighborhoods. This also extends to the key-management: for
MPA, it is only necessary to share keys with the neighbors relevant for the ad-
dressing, but not with all neighbors that may physically exist. Thus, the lot
of key material maintained by the network additionally shrinks, since the “in-
ner” UNN is merely a spanning tree inside the actual network, on which shared
keys are required. Since a tree with n nodes has m = n − 1 edges, we end up
with O(n) keys necessary for confidential and authentic end-to-end security, as
opposed to O(n2) in the conventional setting of symmetric encryption.
6 Discussion
Multipath transmission schemes in UNNs offer the remarkable possibility of
doing something like public-key cryptography without public-key cryptography:
the sender Alice can send an authentic and confidential message to Bob, with
both properties provably implied by graph-topological features only, and not
resting on (unproven) computational intractability. Moreover, Alice and Bob
use only publicly available information for that purpose, with all matters of
symmetric cryptography being handled below the application layer (thus, the
crypto is entirely transparent). Unlike computational intractability, an ISP
can easily assure these conditions to hold in a publicly verifiable manner, and
without bothering its customers Alice or Bob with any key-management at all.
This may especially be interesting in emerging networks such like the internet-
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of-things (IoT).
This note leaves a set of problems open for future research, such as proper-
ties and complexity of the optimization problem (2), and practical (algorithmic)
matters of routing. For ad hoc networks, it is interesting to compute the likeli-
hood of a random graph to be a UNN. This property will not necessarily emerge
suddenly unlike other graph properties, due to lack of monotonicity. However,
the non-monotonicity in connection with the application in the IoT and ad hoc
networking may render UNNs interesting objects to study in the context of
random graphs.
References
[1] C. Bennett and G. Brassard. Public key distribution and coin tossing. In
IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems, and Signal Pro-
cessing, pages 175–179, Los Alamitos, 1984. IEEE Press.
[2] E. Berlekamp and L. Welch. Error Correction of Algebraic Block Codes,
US Patent No. 4,633,470, 1986. Dec. 30,.
[3] G. Chartrand and P. Zhang. Introduction to Graph Theory. Higher educa-
tion. McGraw-Hill, Boston, 2005.
[4] M. Fitzi, M. K. Franklin, J. Garay, and S. H. Vardhan. Towards Optimal
and Efficient Perfectly Secure Message Transmission. In TCC, volume 4392
of LNCS, pages 311–322. Springer, 2007.
[5] R. J. McElice and D. V. Sarwate. On Sharing Secrets and Reed-Solomon
Codes. Commun. ACM, 24(9):583–584, 1981.
[6] S. Rass. On Information-Theoretic Security: Contemporary Problems and
Solutions. PhD thesis, Klagenfurt University, Institute of Applied Infor-
matics, 01.01.2009.
[7] S. Rass. Complexity of Network Design for Private Communication and
the P-vs-NP question. International Journal of Advanced Computer Science
and Applications, 5(2):148–157, 2014.
[8] S. Rass and P. Schartner. Multipath Authentication without shared Se-
crets and with Applications in Quantum Networks. In Proceedings of the
International Conference on Security and Management (SAM), volume 1,
pages 111–115. CSREA Press, 2010.
[9] A. Shamir. How to share a secret. Commun. ACM, 22(11):612–613, 1979.
[10] Y. Wang and Y. Desmedt. Perfectly Secure Message Transmission Revis-
ited. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 54(6):2582–2595, 2008.
UNN Unique-neighborhood network
10
ISP Internet service provider
MPT Multipath transmission
MPA Multipath authentication
MAC Message authentication code
IoT internet-of-things
11
